The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies

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dc.contributor.authorCHARI, V. V.
dc.contributor.authorJONES, L. E.
dc.contributor.authorMARIMON, Ramon
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T15:11:24Z
dc.date.available2011-05-09T15:11:24Z
dc.date.issued1997
dc.description.abstractIn U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. Our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Economic Review, 1997, 87, 5, 957-976
dc.identifier.endpage976
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.issue5
dc.identifier.startpage957
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/16948
dc.identifier.volume87
dc.titleThe Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
person.identifier.other26334
relation.isAuthorOfPublication0f3f37ae-fad5-4460-a96c-31b96bf5082d
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery0f3f37ae-fad5-4460-a96c-31b96bf5082d
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