Law and economics united in diversity : minimalism, fairness, and consumer welfare in EU antitrust and consumer law

dc.contributor.authorESPOSITO, Fabrizio
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-18T14:44:21Z
dc.date.embargo2022-09-17
dc.date.issued2018
dc.descriptionDefence date: 17 September 2018en
dc.descriptionExamining Board: Professor Stefan Grundmann, European University Institute (Supervisor); Professor Miguel Poiares Maduro, European University Institute; Professor Daniel Markovits, Yale Law School; Professor Simon Deakin, University of Cambridgeen
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation proposes a form of collaboration between legal and economic research called Minimalist Law-and-Economics. This approach acknowledges the core commitments of both disciplines and promotes a division of labour based on their comparative advantages. While lawyers expect an analysis that is grounded in legal reasons and respectful of the fairness and wrongfulness theses, economists expect efficient market relations, analysed from an ‘ex-ante’ perspective respectful of epistemological and normative minimalism. The collaboration proposed in this dissertation improves the lawyers’ understanding of market relations and thus enhances their ability to regulate them effectively. Conversely, economists can strengthen the empirical foundations of their research by considering legal reasons as evidence. This is attractive for value choices especially, since their justification is not central to economists’ expertise. To support Minimalist Law-and-Economics, this dissertation warrants three claims: 1) the economic claim holds that consumer welfare is a maxim and used in market efficiency analysis in alternative to total welfare; 2) the translation claim holds that with consumer welfare rather than total welfare as the maxim and, it is possible to offer a plausible economic account of fair market relations; and 3) the doctrinal claim holds that the efficiency hypothesis, which has consumer welfare as maxim and, explains the reasons given in EU antitrust and consumer law better than the traditional efficiency hypothesis based on total welfare. The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I clarifies the conditions for collaboration considered by Minimalist Law-and-Economics. Part II builds the theory that warrants the economic and translation claims. To do this, it gives an account of market relations that are compatible with the fairness and wrongfulness theses and the ‘ex-ante’ perspective. Part III narrows the focus to EU antitrust and consumer law in order to warrant the doctrinal claim and to show how the analysis of legal reasons can be epistemologically and normatively minimalist. United in diversity, economic and legal research may well have a brighter future.en
dc.embargo.terms2022-09-17
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationFlorence : European University Institute, 2018en
dc.identifier.doi10.2870/377684
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/58544
dc.language.isoenen
dc.orcid.uploadtrue*
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/75249
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUIen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLAWen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhD Thesisen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.lcshLaw and economics
dc.subject.lcshAntitrust law
dc.subject.lcshConsumer protection -- Law and legislation
dc.titleLaw and economics united in diversity : minimalism, fairness, and consumer welfare in EU antitrust and consumer lawen
dc.typeThesisen
dspace.entity.typePublication
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-9252-3359
person.identifier.other38234
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4674d4e0-30ed-4657-83cf-0ac119a154e9
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4674d4e0-30ed-4657-83cf-0ac119a154e9
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