Collusion by pricing algorithms in competition law and economics

dc.contributor.authorHANSPACH, Philip
dc.contributor.authorGALLI, Niccolò
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-21T15:21:47Z
dc.date.available2024-02-21T15:21:47Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractSoftware programs based on algorithms have become common in pricing because they outperform humans at automatising tasks in terms of speed, complexity, and accuracy of analysis. In many online markets, repricing algorithms have replaced the human decision-maker. As with any other technology employed in the market, repricing algorithms empower human activity toward both positive and negative consequences. Their properties enable market transparency and efficiencies but also entail collusion risks beyond traditional oligopolies. This paper analyses why repricing algorithms can facilitate anti-competitive coordination and what is the scope for Art. 101(1) TFEU to tackle it. Acknowledging the limitations of EU competition law against collusion by autonomous algorithms, we qualify the antitrust concern through the economics and computer science understanding of pricing algorithms. Algorithmic pricing does not always lead to higher prices, although even simple algorithms can learn complex reward-punishment schemes that resemble collusive pricing strategies.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/76558
dc.language.isoenen
dc.orcid.uploadtrue*
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUIen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRSCen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2024/06en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCentre for a Digital Societyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.licenseAttribution 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectAntitrusten
dc.subjectArtificial intelligenceen
dc.subjectAnti-competitive agreementsen
dc.subjectConcerted practicesen
dc.titleCollusion by pricing algorithms in competition law and economicsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dspace.entity.typePublication
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
person.identifier.orcid0000-0003-3177-6752
person.identifier.orcid0000-0003-1292-0296
person.identifier.other44368
person.identifier.other39419
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationb37757cd-35bf-403e-b760-cfb524d205a6
relation.isAuthorOfPublication5899fd0d-7d00-4448-9818-121361f2fcca
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb37757cd-35bf-403e-b760-cfb524d205a6
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
RSC_2024_06.pdf
Size:
626.45 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Full-text in Open Access
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
3.83 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: