Modelling the Coase Theorem

dc.contributor.author	GUERRA-PUJOL, F. E.
dc.date.accessioned	2013-11-12T14:32:34Z
dc.date.available	2013-11-12T14:32:34Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.description	Published online: 01 February 2013	en
dc.description.abstract	More than fifty years ago Ronald Coase published ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. In his paper, Professor Coase presents an intriguing idea that has since become known among economists and lawyers as the ‘Coase Theorem’. Unlike most modern forms of economic analysis, however, Coase’s Theorem is based on a verbal argument and is almost always proved arithmetically. That is to say, the Coase Theorem is not really a theorem in the formal or mathematical sense of the word. Our objective in this paper, then, is to remedy this deficiency by formalizing the logic of the Coase Theorem. In summary, we combine Coase’s intuitive insights with the formal methods of game theory.	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	en
dc.identifier.citation	European journal of legal studies, 2012, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 179-204	en
dc.identifier.endpage	204
dc.identifier.issn	1973-2937
dc.identifier.issue	2
dc.identifier.startpage	179
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1814/28725
dc.identifier.volume	5
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	European University Institute	en
dc.relation.ispartof	European journal of legal studies	en
dc.relation.uri	https://ejls.eui.eu/	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	en
dc.title	Modelling the Coase Theorem	en
dc.type	Article	en
dspace.entity.type	Publication
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