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'All AIs are psychopaths'? : the scope and impact of a popular analogy
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2210-5433; 2210-5441
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Philosophy & technology, 2025, Vol. 38, No. 27, OnlineFirst
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NERANTZI, Eleni, ‘All AIs are psychopaths’? : the scope and impact of a popular analogy, Philosophy & technology, 2025, Vol. 38, No. 27, OnlineFirst - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/78149
Abstract
Artifcial Intelligence (AI) Agents are often compared to psychopaths in popular news articles. The headlines are ‘eye-catching’, but the questions of what this analogy means or why it matters are hardly answered. The aim of this paper is to take this popular analogy ‘seriously’. By that, I mean two things. First, I aim to explore the scope of this analogy, i.e. to identify and analyse the shared properties of AI agents and psychopaths, namely, their lack of moral emotions and their capacity for instrumental rationality. Second, I aim to examine the impact of the analogy. I argue that both agents, as ‘amoral calculators’, present the perfect candidates to revisit two long-standing debates on moral and criminal responsibility, regarding the necessity of moral emotions for ‘moral-agent-capacity responsibility’ and the necessity of ‘moral-agent-capacity responsibility’ for criminal responsibility. Finally, crossexamining the debates on the moral and criminal responsibility of psychopaths and AI agents is instructive and revealing. Instructive since the moral and legal treatment of psychopaths can be telling about the future treatment of AI agents (and vice versa) and revealing since it makes explicit our often-implicit philosophical commitments on the criteria of moral agency and the overarching purpose of criminal law.
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Published online: 25 February 2025
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This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024). Agreement extended and set to expire on 30 June 2025.