Symbolic conflict resolution and ingroup favoritism
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0022-0027; 1552-8766
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Journal of conflict resolution, 2023, Vol. 67, No. 10, pp. 2028-2057
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MARTÍNEZ, Sergi, VALENTIM, Vicente, DINAS, Elias, Symbolic conflict resolution and ingroup favoritism, Journal of conflict resolution, 2023, Vol. 67, No. 10, pp. 2028-2057 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75344
Abstract
What are the domestic consequences of symbolic conflict resolution? We isolate the effect of symbolic conflict by looking into a dispute with no material stakes (for one side), but high symbolic ones: the Prespa Agreement, which ended the dispute on the name of FYROM, thenceforth named North Macedonia. Greeks opposed this name because the ancient Macedonian heritage is central to their national identity. Based on social identity theory, we expect this threat to the group’s distinctiveness to increase nationalist sentiment. Using an original dataset of flags displayed in the façade of buildings in Athens and Thessaloniki, which we compare to Lisbon, we find an increase in national flags in the Greek cities after the Agreement. The effect is stronger in Thessaloniki, Greek Macedonia’s capital, where the identity threat was more pronounced. We also find that the treaty shifted voters to the right, especially those residing in the region of Macedonia.
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Published online: 12 February 2023