Open Access
Toothless Parliament, Powerless Courts, and Omnipotent Incumbents? The Case of Bahrain
Loading...
License
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
1028-3625
Issue Date
Type of Publication
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Author(s)
Citation
EUI RSCAS; 2009/51; Mediterranean Programme Series
Cite
SCHMIDMAYR, Michael, Toothless Parliament, Powerless Courts, and Omnipotent Incumbents? The Case of Bahrain, EUI RSCAS, 2009/51, Mediterranean Programme Series - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/12681
Abstract
Parliaments and courts, while not necessarily deeply rooted in political tradition, have their place in
the Arab part of the Mediterranean and adjacent countries. Still, parliamentarianism and increased
prominence of concepts such as the rule of law have not turned these countries into democracies at all.
Rather, the Arab world has remained largely authoritarian, in spite of increased space for popular
participation. The present study endeavours to look into the practice of the law—both in its elaboration
and its application—by using the example of Bahrain. After a short but aborted parliamentary
experience between 1973 and 1975, Bahrain reintroduced parliamentary practice in 2002. Yet
institutional settings still provide the impression of a ‘blocked’ system. In the first place, then, it is
rather striking to observe a very active opposition in Bahrain.
This study holds that in spite of legal restrictions, there actually is quite some space for opposition
activity within the system. This means calling into question the paradigm according to which
parliaments and judicial systems in authoritarian regimes remain toothless and totally deprived of any
influence. The facts show that the opposition has actually learned to play with the system’s limits.
Still, there is reason to believe that the ‘real’ processes might also take place in more informal
settings. Therefore, legislative and judiciary assembly rooms actually seem to be mere theatres,
concealing privy dealings that are the true manifestation of government–opposition relations. In this
sense parliaments and courtrooms can serve as places where pressure is built and the price for
subsequent bargaining processes, driven up.
Table of Contents
Additional Information
External Links
Publisher
Version
Research Projects
Sponsorship and Funder Information
(Product of workshop No. 18 at the 10th MRM 2009).