Pundits and quacks : financial experts and market feedback

dc.contributor.author	RUDIGER, Jesper
dc.contributor.author	VIGIER, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned	2014-09-25T11:54:47Z
dc.date.available	2014-09-25T11:54:47Z
dc.date.issued	2014
dc.description.abstract	By choosing whether or not to follow a financial expert’s advice, a privately informed trader implicitly screens the ability of this expert. We explore the performance of the resulting feedback mechanism. In the medium run, feedback may altogether break down, enabling experts of low ability to maintain a lasting reputation and affect prices durably. Yet in the long run, the market almost always learns experts’ true type. While prices get stuck in the medium run, they thus converge in the long run to the asset’s correct valuation.	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	1830-7728
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1814/32831
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	EUI MWP	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2014/22	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	Informational cascades	en
dc.subject	Experts	en
dc.subject	Reputation	en
dc.subject	Asset price bubbles	en
dc.subject	D82	en
dc.subject	D83	en
dc.subject	D84	en
dc.subject	G14	en
dc.subject	G20	en
dc.title	Pundits and quacks : financial experts and market feedback	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dspace.entity.type	Publication
eui.subscribe.skip	true