Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value

dc.contributor.authorALLEN, Franklin
dc.contributor.authorCARLETTI, Elena
dc.contributor.authorMARQUEZ, Robert
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-08T10:03:30Z
dc.date.available2011-03-08T10:03:30Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractIn countries such as Germany, the legal system ensures that firms are stakeholder oriented. In others, like Japan, social norms achieve a similar effect. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to shareholder-oriented firms in a model of imperfect competition. Stakeholder firms are more (less) valuable than shareholder firms when marginal cost uncertainty is greater (less) than demand uncertainty. With globalization shareholder firms and stakeholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms, and compare these mixed equilibria with the pure equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms only. The results have interesting implications for the political economy of foreign entry.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/09/0928.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/15983
dc.language.isoenen
dc.neeo.contributorALLEN|Franklin|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorCARLETTI|Elena|aut|EUI70001
dc.neeo.contributorMARQUEZ|Robert|aut|
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWharton Financial Institutions Centeren
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/28en
dc.titleStakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Valueen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.other32322
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4d9f6295-6d34-4d7d-b21c-8d4c5f7abb74
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4d9f6295-6d34-4d7d-b21c-8d4c5f7abb74
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