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Self-regulatory organizations under the shadow of governmental oversight : an experimental investigation
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1028-3625
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EUI RSCAS; 2014/114
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VAN KOTEN, Silvester, ORTMANN, Andreas, Self-regulatory organizations under the shadow of governmental oversight : an experimental investigation, EUI RSCAS, 2014/114 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/33632
Abstract
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.