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Votes for sale
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1028-3625
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EUI; RSC; Working Paper; 2023/55; Global Governance Programme
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TICKU, Rohit, Votes for sale, EUI, RSC, Working Paper, 2023/55, Global Governance Programme - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75846
Abstract
This paper examines the financial gains derived from holding public office for independent legislators in India. Given that party-affiliated legislators are legally prohibited from engaging
in cross-voting or defection, I hypothesize that independent legislators can secure rents when their support becomes pivotal for government formation. Utilizing candidate asset disclosures from Indian state elections spanning 2003 to 2012, I demonstrate that independent legislators amass wealth at a faster pace than their party-affiliated counterparts in states where the largest party or coalition falls short of a majority. The point estimates suggest that, for each additional seat that the largest party or coalition falls short of a majority, an independent legislator experiences an approximate 2% annual increase in their assets relative to a party affiliated legislator. The disproportionate gains are particularly prominent in movable assets,
implying a potential quid-pro-quo involving cash payments.