Diagonal enforcement in international trade politics
| dc.contributor.author | PHELAN, William | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-01-18T11:09:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-01-18T11:09:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Scholarship on the enforcement of international legal obligations often makes a fundamental division between "horizontal" (inter-state retaliation) and "vertical" (national court) enforcement mechanisms. This paper argues that such a division of treaty enforcement mechanisms fails to capture how "horizontal" and "vertical" enforcement relationships can be combined in one important scenario, where a state's acceptance of an obligation on their domestic courts to automatically enforce trade-based treaty obligations is matched by an abandonment by the state's trading partners of more common forms of retaliation-based enforcement mechanism. On the one hand, therefore, states allow their trade treaty obligations to be automatically enforced by domestic courts, while on the other, the beneficiaries of such a commitment in other states forego any rights to threaten trade sanctions to enforce treaty obligations. Such a "diagonal" enforcement mechanism is illustrated with examples drawn from the World Trade Organization, European Union, Andean Community, and NAFTA Side Agreements. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6755 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/38445 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI SPS | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2016/01 | en |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
| dc.subject | Trade politics | en |
| dc.subject | Dispute settlement | en |
| dc.subject | Legalization | en |
| dc.subject | Domestic courts | en |
| dc.subject | Retaliation | en |
| dc.title | Diagonal enforcement in international trade politics | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication |
