Comparative institutional analysis, the European Court of Justice and the general principle of non-discrimination - or - alternative tales on equality reasoning

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dc.contributor.authorCROON, Johanna
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-04T16:34:50Z
dc.date.available2014-12-04T16:34:50Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractThe general principle of equality in European law is often held to be inconsistently applied by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and insufficiently supported by methodology. Contrary to this assessment, this paper argues that there is substantial coherence and theoretical underpinning to the court's equality reasoning. First, it shows that the respective case-law can be subdivided into three groups, depending on the level of scrutiny applied. Second, it establishes that the prevailing accounts have difficulty in explaining the court's choice of scrutiny due to their limited selection of analytical parameters. Third, it concludes that comparative institutional analysis offers an alternative framework to make the ECJ's testing approaches in equality matters more intelligible.
dc.identifier.citationEuropean law journal, 2013, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 153-173
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/eulj.12018
dc.identifier.endpage173
dc.identifier.issn1351-5993
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.startpage153
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33714
dc.identifier.volume19
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean law journal
dc.titleComparative institutional analysis, the European Court of Justice and the general principle of non-discrimination - or - alternative tales on equality reasoning
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.other33439
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationc971306e-5717-419e-9a0d-58d5797cbe20
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryc971306e-5717-419e-9a0d-58d5797cbe20
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