The legislative role of the Russian Duma and the Kazakh Mazhilis : authoritarianism and power sharing in post-Soviet Eurasia
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1938-2855; 1060-586X
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Post-Soviet affairs, 2021, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 559-577
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KROL, Leendert Jan Gerrit, The legislative role of the Russian Duma and the Kazakh Mazhilis : authoritarianism and power sharing in post-Soviet Eurasia, Post-Soviet affairs, 2021, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 559-577 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/77566
Abstract
The Russian Duma and the Kazakh Mazhilis are typical examples of formally democratic legislatures in authoritarian regimes. This article investigates their role and asks why different authoritarian legislatures have different levels of law-making activity. Neo-institutionalist scholarship argues that legislatures stabilize authoritarian regimes by institutionalizing access to decision-making, but this literature requires further evidence showing which factors stimulate a parliament’s law-making function. The analysis uses an original dataset on 7,564 bills in Russia and Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2016 to explore how different power-sharing arrangements affect the legislative output of both parliaments. The results show that the Duma is much more active in terms of initiating laws and amending executive bills because of its highly differentiated committee system. Nevertheless, both legislatures have become more active after electoral contestedness decreased when United Russia and Nur Otan emerged. This suggests that internal parliamentary organization stimulates law-making activity, whereas electoral contestedness obstructs collective decision-making.
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Published online: 26 August 2021