Investment treaty reform when regulatory chill causes global warming
| dc.contributor.author | HORN, Henrik | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-02-20T15:53:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-02-20T15:53:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
| dc.description.abstract | State-to-state investment protection treaties, and the Energy Charter Treaty in particular, are alleged to dissuade host countries from regulating foreign-owned investment with adverse climate impact. This paper examines implications of treaty reforms that have been proposed as remedies for such regulatory chill. It finds that an increased carve-out, and reduced compensation in case of regulation, can address the stranded investment problem, but might not be accepted by both parties to the agreement. Disallowing investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) solves the chill less effectively, but is more acceptable to both parties. Shortening of a sunset period applicable to unilateral withdrawal will tend to worsen the problem. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1028-3625 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75358 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.orcid.upload | true | * |
| dc.publisher | European University Institute | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | RSC | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2023/12 | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Global Governance Programme-496 | en |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
| dc.rights.license | Attribution 4.0 International | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | Investment treaties | en |
| dc.subject | Climate | en |
| dc.subject | Stranded assets | en |
| dc.subject | Regulatory chill | en |
| dc.title | Investment treaty reform when regulatory chill causes global warming | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true |
