The controversies about legal indeterminacy and the thesis of the ‘norm as a framework’ in Kelsen

dc.contributor.author	DEL REAL ALCALÁ, Juan Alberto
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-21T10:47:19Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-21T10:47:19Z
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.description	Published online: 06 February 2014	en
dc.description.abstract	One of the most persistent controversies in law is related to its completeness or incompleteness. In the context of the debate between inconclusive law or the completeness of the law, the main argument of the paper is that Hans Kelsen paradoxically converges with Ronald Dworkin in denying legal indeterminacy, and albeit from radically different and opposing positions, both of them would arrive at the same conclusion in the discussion about completeness or incompleteness in the law: the law is ‘complete’. Both advocate a position contrary to HLA Hart.	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	en
dc.identifier.citation	European journal of legal studies, 2013, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 224-242	en
dc.identifier.endpage	242
dc.identifier.issn	1973-2937
dc.identifier.issue	2
dc.identifier.startpage	224
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1814/30546
dc.identifier.volume	6
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	European University Institute	en
dc.relation.ispartof	European journal of legal studies	en
dc.relation.uri	https://ejls.eui.eu/	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	en
dc.title	The controversies about legal indeterminacy and the thesis of the ‘norm as a framework’ in Kelsen	en
dc.type	Article	en
dspace.entity.type	Publication
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