Two Concepts of Social Equality: What Luck Has Got To Do With It?

SADURSKI, Wojciech

Two Concepts of Social Equality: What Luck Has Got To Do With It?

dc.contributor.author	SADURSKI, Wojciech
dc.date.accessioned	2007-02-23T08:34:47Z
dc.date.available	2007-02-23T08:34:47Z
dc.date.issued	2007
dc.description.abstract	A conventional distinction – that between an “individualized” and a “collective” concept of social equality – is misleading and unhelpful. This can be best shown by reflecting upon one, particularly interesting, and these days influential, theory of social equality – usually, but misleadingly, considered to be an epitome of an individualistic approach, namely socalled “luck egalitarianism”. Luck-egalitarianism is often (and with good reason) characterized also as responsibility-based egalitarianism – and therefore the relationship between “luck” and “responsibility” in this general conception of social equality is considered in this paper. Then, continuing this exploration of the problématique of luck egalitarianism, the paper discusses, and largely rejects, the fundamental equality-based objection to luck egalitarianism: that it is unfaithful to some of our widespread, equalitysensitive intuitions. The essence of this objection (which is reject in the paper) is that luckegalitarianism is not really egalitarian in a morally attractive way.	en
dc.format.extent	364385 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	1725-6739
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6711
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries	EUI LAW	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2007/04	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	Equality	en
dc.subject	Non-discrimination	en
dc.subject	Social justice	en
dc.subject	Paternalism	en
dc.title	Two Concepts of Social Equality: What Luck Has Got To Do With It?	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dspace.entity.type	Publication
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