Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games
| dc.contributor.author | GALBIATI, Marco | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-07-06T14:57:56Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2006-07-06T14:57:56Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of divisible homogeneous goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic Behavior), a new simple mechanism is presented here with the following properties: a) the mechanism fully implements the desired divisions, i.e. for each preference profile the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of fair divisions; b) the set of equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. Thus, players myopically adapting their strategies settle down in an fair division. The result holds even if mixed strategies are used. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 284724 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6092 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.neeo.contributor | GALBIATI|Marco|aut| | |
| dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2006/24 | en |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.subject | Fair divisions | en |
| dc.subject | Envy-free | en |
| dc.subject | Implementation | en |
| dc.subject | Best reply dynamics | en |
| dc.title | Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
| person.identifier.other | 28652 | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 707703c5-37f6-436c-bddf-29c7d02f1319 | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 707703c5-37f6-436c-bddf-29c7d02f1319 |
