Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility and Persistence

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dc.contributor.authorHERTWECK, Matthias S.
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-02T15:50:54Z
dc.date.available2007-02-02T15:50:54Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.description.abstractThis paper modifies the standard Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model in order to explain the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment. The modifications include strategic wage bargaining (Hall and Milgrom, 2006) and convex labor adjustment costs. The results reveal that our model replicates the cyclical behavior of both variables remarkably well. First, we show that strategic wage bargaining increases the volatility of vacancies and unemployment enormously. Second, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs makes both variables much more persistent. Third, our analysis indicates that both modifications are complementary in generating volatile and persistent labor market variables.en
dc.format.extent909834 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/6687
dc.language.isoenen
dc.neeo.contributorHERTWECK|Matthias S.|aut|
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006/42en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectE24en
dc.subjectE32en
dc.subjectJ41en
dc.subjectBusiness cyclesen
dc.subjectMatchingen
dc.subjectStrategic bargainingen
dc.titleStrategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility and Persistenceen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dspace.entity.typePublication
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
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