Sovereign debt issuance and selective default

dc.contributor.authorPACZOS, Wojtek
dc.contributor.authorSHAKHNOV, Kirill
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-10T17:07:17Z
dc.date.available2016-03-10T17:07:17Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractWe propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international markets and why defaults are mostly selective (on either domestic or foreign investors). Domestic debt issuance can only smooth tax distortion shocks, whereas foreign debt can also smooth productivity shocks. If the correlation of these shocks is sufficiently low, the sovereign borrows on both markets to avoid excess consumption volatility. Defaults on both types of investors arise in equilibrium due to market incompleteness and the government's limited commitment. The model matches business cycle moments and frequencies of different types of defaults in emerging economies and we show our hypothesis is confirmed by the data. We also find that secondary markets are not a sufficient condition to avoid sovereign defaults. The outcome of the trade in bonds on secondary markets depends on how well each group of investors can coordinate their actions.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/39627
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2016/04en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectSovereign debten
dc.subjectSelective defaulten
dc.subjectDebt compositionen
dc.subjectSecondary marketsen
dc.subjectE43en
dc.subjectF34en
dc.subjectG15en
dc.subjectH63en
dc.titleSovereign debt issuance and selective defaulten
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.other33992
person.identifier.other33879
relation.isAuthorOfPublication21a54c8f-ba0b-4bdd-86c9-dfb109095e84
relation.isAuthorOfPublication71236075-1b85-43aa-af58-4b397ae04b2a
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery21a54c8f-ba0b-4bdd-86c9-dfb109095e84
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