Electoral Systems and Public Spending

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dc.contributor.authorMILESI-FERRETTI, G. M.
dc.contributor.authorPEROTTI, Roberto
dc.contributor.authorROSTAGNO, M.
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:48:52Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:48:52Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.description.abstractWe study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policy-making under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions.
dc.identifier.citationQuarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117, 2, 609-657
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/003355302753650346
dc.identifier.endpage657
dc.identifier.issn0033-5533
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.startpage609
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/16566
dc.identifier.volume117
dc.language.isoen
dc.neeo.contributorMILESI-FERRETTI|G. M.|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorPEROTTI|Roberto|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorROSTAGNO|M.|aut|
dc.publisherMIT Press
dc.titleElectoral Systems and Public Spending
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
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