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dc.contributor.authorSCHUETT, Florian
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-13T09:53:11Z
dc.date.available2009-07-13T09:53:11Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/12051
dc.description.abstractThe objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Good applications - those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and nonobviousness - should be accepted, while bad applications should be rejected. How should incentives for examiners be designed to further this objective? This paper develops a theoretical model of patent examination to address the question. It argues that examination can be described as a moral-hazard problem followed by an adverse-selection problem: the examiner must be given incentives to exert effort (looking for evidence to reject), but also to truthfully reveal the evidence he finds (or lack thereof). The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as variation in compensation schemes across patent offices. It also has implications for the retention of examiners and for administrative patent review.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/28en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectinnovationen
dc.subjectpatent officeen
dc.subjectsoft informationen
dc.subjectintrinsic motivationen
dc.subjectincentives for bureaucratsen
dc.subjectO31en
dc.subjectO38en
dc.subjectD73en
dc.subjectD82en
dc.subjectL50en
dc.titleInventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examinationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorSCHUETT|Florian|aut|
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