Date: 2009
Type: Working Paper
Why Lawyers Are Nice (or Nasty). A Game-Theoretical Argumentation Exercise
Working Paper, EUI LAW, 2009/08
SARTOR, Giovanni, RUDNIANSKI, Michel, ROTOLO, Antonino, RIVERET, Régis, MAYOR, Eunate, Why Lawyers Are Nice (or Nasty). A Game-Theoretical Argumentation Exercise, EUI LAW, 2009/08 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/12320
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal
institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of
lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining
outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and
analyse the evolution of the population.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/12320
ISSN: 1725-6739
Series/Number: EUI LAW; 2009/08
Keyword(s): Law Game theory Evolution Argumentation Litigation
Published version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/30408
