| dc.contributor.author | BISIN, Alberto | |
| dc.contributor.author | GEANAKOPOLS, John | |
| dc.contributor.author | GOTTARDI, Piero | |
| dc.contributor.author | MINELLI, Enrico | |
| dc.contributor.author | POLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-06T12:26:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-07-06T12:26:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/14255 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of
the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit
modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts;
this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or
price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable.
But, for a generic economy, there exist Pareto improving interventions via
linear, anonymous taxes. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2010/29 | en |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.subject | asymmetric information | en |
| dc.subject | competitive markets | en |
| dc.subject | equilibrium | en |
| dc.subject | D50 | en |
| dc.subject | D52 | en |
| dc.subject | D82 | en |
| dc.title | Markets and Contracts | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| dc.neeo.contributor | BISIN|Alberto|aut| | |
| dc.neeo.contributor | GEANAKOPOLS|John|aut| | |
| dc.neeo.contributor | GOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004 | |
| dc.neeo.contributor | MINELLI|Enrico|aut| | |
| dc.neeo.contributor | POLEMARCHAKIS|Herakles|aut| | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
