Type: Working Paper
Maastricht Games and Maastricht Contracts
Working Paper, Florence : European University Institute, 1997 EUI RSC, 1997/27
WINKLER, Bernhard, Maastricht Games and Maastricht Contracts, Florence : European University Institute, 1997 EUI RSC, 1997/27 - http://hdl.handle.net/1814/1505
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
This paper characterizes the Maastricht transaction as a deal that trades the replacement of the Bundesbank by a European Central Bank at the centre of European monetary affairs as a reward for prior convergence. Several potential inefficiencies of this transaction are explored and we ask how they are addressed by the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. We find that the Treaty serves as a contract device that provides commitment to cooperative outcomes, sets incentives for cooperative behaviour and determines the timing and procedures for decisionmaking and bargaining.
Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.
Cadmus permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/1505
Series/Number: EUI RSC; 1997/27
Publisher: European University Institute