dc.contributor.author | HORAN, David | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-12-15T11:28:29Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-12-15T11:28:29Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/15210 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the performance of government subsidy programs which fund business R&D projects. A commonly used criterion for distributing funding is the case-by-case (CbC) rule. Under the rule, project funding is decided based on the gap between a project’s social and private return. This paper finds that in the presence of pervasive complementarity in R&D activities CbC funding is socially excessive. On the other hand, in the presence of pervasive substitutability in R&D activities CbC funding is socially insufficient. Since the situation can differ greatly from one industry to the next, these findings suggest governments may be over-funding research in some industries at the expense of research in other under-funded industries. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2010/38 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | R&D Subsidies | en |
dc.subject | Interaction in R&D | en |
dc.subject | Case-by-Case Subsidy | en |
dc.subject | Rule | en |
dc.subject | Welfare | en |
dc.subject | H40 | en |
dc.subject | O31 | en |
dc.subject | O38 | en |
dc.subject | O30 | en |
dc.title | Interaction in R&D and the case-by-case subsidy rule | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |