Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHORAN, David
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-15T11:28:29Z
dc.date.available2010-12-15T11:28:29Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/15210
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the performance of government subsidy programs which fund business R&D projects. A commonly used criterion for distributing funding is the case-by-case (CbC) rule. Under the rule, project funding is decided based on the gap between a project’s social and private return. This paper finds that in the presence of pervasive complementarity in R&D activities CbC funding is socially excessive. On the other hand, in the presence of pervasive substitutability in R&D activities CbC funding is socially insufficient. Since the situation can differ greatly from one industry to the next, these findings suggest governments may be over-funding research in some industries at the expense of research in other under-funded industries.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010/38en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectR&D Subsidiesen
dc.subjectInteraction in R&Den
dc.subjectCase-by-Case Subsidyen
dc.subjectRuleen
dc.subjectWelfareen
dc.subjectH40en
dc.subjectO31en
dc.subjectO38en
dc.subjectO30en
dc.titleInteraction in R&D and the case-by-case subsidy ruleen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files associated with this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record