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dc.contributor.authorCOOPER, Russell
dc.contributor.authorKEMPF, Hubert
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-07T13:24:53Z
dc.date.available2011-02-07T13:24:53Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/15648
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the provision of deposit insurance without commitment in an economy with heterogenous households. When households are identical, deposit insurance will be provided ex post to reap insurance gains. But the ex post provision of deposit insurance redistributes consumption when households differ in their claims on the banking system as well as in their tax obligations to finance the deposit insurance. Deposit insurance will not be provided ex post if it requires a (socially) undesirable redistribution of consumption which outweighs insurance gains.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/07en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleDeposit Insurance without Commitment: Wall St. versus Main St.en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorCOOPER|Russell|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorKEMPF|Hubert|aut|
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