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dc.contributor.authorMUTUSWAMI, Suresh
dc.contributor.authorWINTER, Eyal
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:49:00Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:49:00Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106, 2, 242-264
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16575
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science
dc.subjectnetworks
dc.subjectmechanism design
dc.subjectshapley value
dc.titleSubscription Mechanisms for Network Formation
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jeth.2001.2920
dc.neeo.contributorMUTUSWAMI|Suresh|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorWINTER|Eyal|aut|
dc.identifier.volume106
dc.identifier.startpage242
dc.identifier.endpage264
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dc.identifier.issue2


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