dc.contributor.author | MUTUSWAMI, Suresh | |
dc.contributor.author | WINTER, Eyal | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-04-19T12:49:00Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-04-19T12:49:00Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106, 2, 242-264 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16575 | |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20. | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science | |
dc.subject | networks | |
dc.subject | mechanism design | |
dc.subject | shapley value | |
dc.title | Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1006/jeth.2001.2920 | |
dc.neeo.contributor | MUTUSWAMI|Suresh|aut| | |
dc.neeo.contributor | WINTER|Eyal|aut| | |
dc.identifier.volume | 106 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 242 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 264 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | |