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dc.contributor.authorYORDANOVA, Nikoleta
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:49:46Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:49:46Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationWest European Politics, 2011, 34, 1, 97-121
dc.identifier.issn0140-2382
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16639
dc.description.abstractStudies on the European Parliament have largely overlooked the impact of the inter-institutional context on its internal organisation. This paper argues that the stronger legislative powers of the Parliament vis-a-vis the Council of Ministers under the co-decision than under the consultation procedure affect the intra-parliamentary allocation of different types of legislative report. The analysis of the period 2004-07 shows that legislators from the centre-right party group coalition and loyal party group members are privileged in the allocation of co-decision reports. In contrast, legislators with outlying special interests and experts are given systematic access to drafting only consultation reports. The higher competition for co-decision versus consultation reports left unchecked by the formal EP rules has thus been exploited by party group leaders to promote group cohesion and coalition-building, producing clear winners and losers.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherRoutledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd
dc.titleInter-Institutional Rules and Division of Power in the European Parliament: Allocation of Consultation and Co-Decision Reports
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/01402382.2011.523547
dc.identifier.volume34
dc.identifier.startpage97
dc.identifier.endpage121
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue1


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