Oligopoly Limit Pricing - Strategic Substitutes, Strategic Complements
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1995, 13, 1, 41-65
MARTIN, Stephen, Oligopoly Limit Pricing - Strategic Substitutes, Strategic Complements, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1995, 13, 1, 41-65 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16782
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Conditions are outlined under which it is a sequential equilibrium for firms to forgo current profit to reduce the likelihood of entry, if firms are uncertain about rivals' costs. The assumptions about out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain such equilibria are more plausible if firms produce strategic substitutes than if firms produce strategic complements.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16782
Full-text via DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(94)00442-5
Earlier different version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/495
Version: The article is a published version of EUI ECO WP; 1994/15
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