The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies
American Economic Review, 1997, 87, 5, 957-976
CHARI, V. V., JONES, L. E., MARIMON, Ramon, The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies, American Economic Review, 1997, 87, 5, 957-976 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16948
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. Our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.
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