| dc.description.abstract | This paper reconsiders the division of the literature on electoral competition into models with forwardlooking
voters and those with backward-looking voters by combining ideas from both strands of the
literature. As long as there is no uncertainty about voters' policy preferences and parties can commit in
advance to a policy platform but not to a maximal level of rent extraction, voters can limit rents to the
same extent as in a purely backward-looking model. At the same time, the policy preferred by the
median voter is implemented as in a standard forward-looking model of political competition on an
ideological policy dimension. Voters achieve this outcome by following a simple lexicographic voting
strategy. They cast their vote in favor of their preferred policy position, but make their vote dependent
on the incumbent parties' performance in office whenever they are indifferent. When uncertainty about
the bliss point of the median voter is introduced into the model, voters have to accept higher rent
payments, but they still retain some control over rent extraction. | en |
