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dc.contributor.authorDONI, Nicola
dc.contributor.authorMENICUCCI, Domenico
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-07T14:17:53Z
dc.date.available2011-09-07T14:17:53Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/18355
dc.description.abstractWe consider an asymmetric auction setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder has a binary support. We prove that in this context the second price auction yields a higher expected revenue than the first price auction for a broad set of parameter values, although the opposite result is common in the literature on asymmetric auctions. For instance, the second price auction is superior both when a bidder’s valuation is more uncertain that the valuation of the other bidder, and in case of a not too large distribution shift or rescaling. In addition, we show that in some cases the revenue in the first price auction decreases when all the valuations increase [in doing so, we correct a claim in Maskin and Riley (1985)], and we derive the bidders’ preferences between the two auctions.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/27en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectD44en
dc.subjectD82en
dc.subjectAsymmetric auctionsen
dc.subjectFirst price auctionsen
dc.subjectSecond price auctionsen
dc.titleRevenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuationsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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