dc.contributor.author | DONI, Nicola | |
dc.contributor.author | MENICUCCI, Domenico | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-07T14:17:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-09-07T14:17:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/18355 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider an asymmetric auction setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder has a binary support. We prove that in this context the second price auction yields a higher expected revenue than the first price auction for a broad set of parameter values, although the opposite result is common in the literature on asymmetric auctions. For instance, the second price auction is superior both when a bidder’s valuation is more uncertain that the valuation of the other bidder, and in case of a not too large distribution shift or rescaling. In addition, we show that in some cases the revenue in the first price auction decreases when all the valuations increase [in doing so, we correct a claim in Maskin and Riley (1985)], and we derive the bidders’ preferences between the two auctions. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2011/27 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | D44 | en |
dc.subject | D82 | en |
dc.subject | Asymmetric auctions | en |
dc.subject | First price auctions | en |
dc.subject | Second price auctions | en |
dc.title | Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |