Title:Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete Author(s):FUMAGALLI, Chiara; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2006Citation:
- American Economic Review, 2006, 96, 3, 785-795
Type:ArticleAbstract:Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when ...
Title:Review of Michael Whinston’s ‘Lectures in Antitrust Economics Author(s):MOTTA, MassimoDate:2007Citation:
- Competition Policy International, 2007, 3, 1, 312-320
Title:Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters Author(s):KARLINGER, Liliane; MOTTA, MassimoDate:2007Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2007/30Abstract:We consider an incumbent firm and a more effcient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero at the ...
Title:Beyond the Spectrum Constraint: Concentration and Entry in the Broadcasting Industry Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; POLO, MicheleDate:2003Citation:
- M. BALDASSARRI, L. LAMBERTINI (eds.), Antitrust, Regulation and Competition, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, Ch.3
Type:Contribution to book
Title:Product Differentiation and Endogenous Mode of Competition Author(s):MOTTA, MassimoDate:1998Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:IGIER Working Paper; 1998/134
Title:Foreign Direct Investments and Spillovers Through Workers' Mobility Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; FOSFURI, Andrea; RONDE, ThomasDate:2001Citation:
- Journal of International Economics, 2001, 53, 1, 205-222
Type:ArticleAbstract:We analyze a model where a multinational firm can use a superior technology in a foreign subsidiary only after training a local worker. Technological spillovers from foreign direct investment arise when this worker is later ...
Title:Oltre il 'vincolo dello spettro': concentrazione ed entrata nell'industria dei servizi televisivi Author(s):MOTTA, Massimo; POLO, MicheleDate:2001Citation:
- Rivista di Politica Economica, 2001, XCI, 4-5, 115-150