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dc.contributor.authorDE FRAJA, Gianni
dc.contributor.authorMICHETTI, Emanuela
dc.contributor.authorZANCHETTIN, Piercarlo
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2011, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 383-414en
dc.descriptionThe paper studies the regulatory design in an industry where the regulated downstream provider of services to final consumers purchases the necessary inputs from an upstream supplier. The model is closely inspired by the UK regulatory mechanism for the railway network. Its philosophy is one of vertical separation between ownership and operation of the rolling stock: the Train Operating Company (TOC) leases from a ROlling Stock COmpany (ROSCO) the trains it uses in its franchise. This, we show, increases the flexibility and competitiveness of the network. On the other hand, it also reduces the specificity of the rolling stock, thus increasing the cost of running the service, and the TOC’s incentive to exert quality enhancing effort, thus reducing the utility of the final users. Our simple model shows that the UK regime of separation may in fact be preferable from a welfare viewpoint.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries[Florence School of Regulation]en
dc.titleToc'n'Roll : bargaining, service quality and specificity in the UK railway networken

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