dc.contributor.author | VAN KOTEN, Silvester | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-05T15:26:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-12-05T15:26:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.citation | European Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 543-573 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1572-9990 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1261 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/19498 | |
dc.description | First published online on 8 September 2011. | en |
dc.description.abstract | This paper addresses the effectiveness of auctions and legal unbundling as regulatory measures to tender a vertically integrated industry more competitive. Specifically, I analyze if implementing auctions and legal unbundling can counter market power in an industry where a Vertically Integrated Corporation (VIC) has a monopoly position in an essential, scarce upstream activity and also owns one of the firms active in the competitive downstream activity. In an earlier paper, Van Koten (2011), I showed that in this configuration the VIC, by having its downstream firm bid more aggressively, can—through increased auction revenue—increase its profit, while disadvantaging downstream competitors and lowering efficiency. Here I analyze the regulatory measure of also legally separating the downstream firm from the VIC. I show that such a measure may only be partially effective; the VIC can formulate a simple compensation scheme that does not violate restrictions typically imposed by legal separation but induces the manager of the VIC-owned downstream firm to bid more aggressively. This increases the profits of the VIC, decreases efficiency, and disadvantages downstream competitors. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [Florence School of Regulation] | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [Energy] | en |
dc.relation.uri | www.springerlink.com | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Regulation | en |
dc.subject | Vertical integration | en |
dc.subject | Competition | en |
dc.subject | Electricity markets | en |
dc.subject | Strategic delegation | en |
dc.title | Legal unbundling and auctions in vertically integrated (utilities) markets | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10657-011-9269-0 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 36 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 543 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 573 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | |