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dc.contributor.authorBIANCO, Giuseppe
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-05T14:31:12Z
dc.date.available2012-09-05T14:31:12Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/23428
dc.description.abstractThis working paper examines the institutional reaction to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The response has so far consisted of three new financial mechanisms: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, and the European Stability Mechanism. These have each a different legal basis and a specific regime. They display a varying degree of compatibility with EU law. The institutional quick fix employed by Eurozone countries was essentially a resort to private law and traditional international law techniques. This constitutes a setback from the evolution of the EU, at the expense mainly of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/44en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUDO - European Union Democracy Observatoryen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectEuropean sovereign debt crisisen
dc.subjectEuropean Financial Stabilisation Mechanismen
dc.subjectEuropean Financial Stability Facilityen
dc.subjectEuropean Stability Mechanismen
dc.subjectno-bailout clauseen
dc.titleThe New Financial Stability Mechanisms and Their (Poor) Consistency with EU Lawen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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