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dc.contributor.authorLEVMORE, Saul
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T10:03:18Z
dc.date.available2012-09-28T10:03:18Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1830-1541
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/23982
dc.description.abstractInterest groups have played an important if unappreciated role in shaping intellectual property rights. As economies are driven by ideas, rather than manufactured goods, there is likely to be a reconfiguration of the incentives granted and withheld from innovators. The paper argues that prizes (rather than intellectual property rights) – including grants, subsidies, and various contractual promises – will increase in importance. The discussion includes prizes as substitutes for both patents and copyrights, and suggests that industries as diverse as pharmaceuticals and newsgathering are likely fields for an "iPrize Revolution." The change is the product of interest group forces and not necessarily efficient.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCAS PPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2012/10en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Governance Programmeen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Economicsen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectIntellectual propertyen
dc.subjectinterest groupsen
dc.subjectprizesen
dc.subject.otherRegulation and economic policy
dc.titleA Public Choice View of IP(rizes)en
dc.typeOtheren
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


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