dc.contributor.author | LEVMORE, Saul | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-28T10:03:18Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-28T10:03:18Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1830-1541 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/23982 | |
dc.description.abstract | Interest groups have played an important if unappreciated role in shaping intellectual property rights. As economies are driven by ideas, rather than manufactured goods, there is likely to be a reconfiguration of the incentives granted and withheld from innovators. The paper argues that prizes (rather than intellectual property rights) – including grants, subsidies, and various contractual promises – will increase in importance. The discussion includes prizes as substitutes for both patents and copyrights, and suggests that industries as diverse as pharmaceuticals and newsgathering are likely fields for an "iPrize Revolution." The change is the product of interest group forces and not necessarily efficient. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI RSCAS PP | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2012/10 | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Global Governance Programme | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Global Economics | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.subject | Intellectual property | en |
dc.subject | interest groups | en |
dc.subject | prizes | en |
dc.subject.other | Regulation and economic policy | |
dc.title | A Public Choice View of IP(rizes) | en |
dc.type | Other | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |