Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBREMBERGER, Francisca
dc.contributor.authorCAMBINI, Carlo
dc.contributor.authorGUGLER, Klaus
dc.contributor.authorRONDI, Laura
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-09T16:52:53Z
dc.date.available2013-07-09T16:52:53Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/27598
dc.description.abstractWe study the impact of different regulatory and ownership regimes on the dividend policy of regulated firms. Using a panel of 106 publicly traded European electric utilities in the period 1986-2010, we link payout and smoothing decisions to the implementation of different regulatory mechanisms (cost plus vs. incentive regulation) and to firm ownership (state vs. private). After controlling for the potential endogeneity of the regulatory mechanism, our results show that utilities subject to incentive regulation smooth their dividends less than firms subject to cost-based regulation and present higher impact effects and target payout ratios. This suggests that when managers are more sensitive to competition-like efficiency pressures following the adoption of incentive regulation, they adopt a dividend policy more responsive to earnings variability and more consistent with optimal cash management. These results, however, apply only to private utilities. If the state still has ultimate control, smoothing of dividends remains irrespective of the regulatory mechanism. It seems that corporate governance (i.e. state control) trumps regulation when it comes to dividend payout policy.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2013/53en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFlorence School of Regulationen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEnergyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectDividendsen
dc.subjectLintner modelen
dc.subjectIncentive regulationen
dc.subjectElectricityen
dc.subjectG35en
dc.subjectG38en
dc.subjectL51en
dc.subjectL94en
dc.titleDividend policy in regulated firmsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files associated with this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record