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dc.contributor.authorHOEKMAN, Bernard M.
dc.contributor.authorMAVROIDIS, Petros C.
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-11T08:56:35Z
dc.date.available2013-07-11T08:56:35Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/27611
dc.description.abstractPlurilateral agreements in the WTO context allow sub-sets of countries to agree to commitments in specific policy areas that only apply to signatories, and thus allow for ‘variable geometry’ in the WTO. Plurilateral agreements share a number of features with preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that are increasingly used by governments to liberalize trade in goods and services. This paper discusses the current institutional framework that governs these two alternatives, and that distinguishes them from the general, nondiscriminatory agreements that are negotiated among—and apply to—all WTO Members. Current WTO rules make it much more difficult to pursue the plurilateral route than to negotiate a PTA. We review the arguments for and against making it easier for “issue-specific” clubs to form in the WTO, and discuss how concerns raised by some WTO Members regarding the potential negative impact of plurilateral agreements on the multilateral trading system might be addressed. We take the view that action to facilitate the negotiation of plurilateral agreements in the WTO should be considered and that the potential downsides for the multilateral trading system can be managed.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2013/58en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Governance Programme-57en
dc.relation.ispartofseries[Global Economics]en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectWTOen
dc.subjectPlurilateralen
dc.subjectTrade agreementsen
dc.subjectDoha Rounden
dc.subjectClubsen
dc.subjectF13en
dc.subjectK32en
dc.subject.otherInstitutions and policy-making
dc.titleWTO ‘à la carte’ or WTO ‘menu du jour’? : assessing the case for plurilateral agreementsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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