Date: 2013
Type: Article
The Court of Reason in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
Kant-Studien, 2013, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 301–320
MØLLER, Sofie Christine, The Court of Reason in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Kant-Studien, 2013, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 301–320
- https://hdl.handle.net/1814/28682
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
The aim of the present paper is to discuss how the legal metaphors in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can help us understand the work’s transcendental argumentation. I discuss Dieter Henrich’s claim that legal deductions form a methodological paradigm for all three Critiques that exempts the deductions from following a stringent logical structure. I also consider Rüdiger Bubner’s proposal that the legal metaphors show that the transcendental deduction is a rhetorical argument. On the basis of my own reading of the many different uses of legal analogies in the first Critique, I argue that they cannot form a consistent methodological paradigm as Henrich and Bubner claim.
Additional information:
Published Online: 2013-09-01
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/28682
Full-text via DOI: 10.1515/kant-2013-0021
ISSN: 1613-1134; 0022-8877
Succeeding version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/48764
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