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dc.contributor.authorBALAFOUTAS, Loukas
dc.contributor.authorBECK, Adrian
dc.contributor.authorKERSCHBAMER, Rudolf
dc.contributor.authorSUTTER, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-28T15:57:34Z
dc.date.available2014-01-28T15:57:34Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/29568
dc.description.abstractIn markets where transactions are governed by contractual incompleteness, revealed intentions to evade taxes may affect market performance. We experimentally examine the impact of tax evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the good. We find that tax evasion attempts – independently of whether they are successful or not – lead to efficiency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent trade. Thus, shadow economies induce an excess burden not only by hampering the collection of tax revenues, but also by reducing market efficiency.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2014/01en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectCredence goodsen
dc.subjectExpert servicesen
dc.subjectTax evasionen
dc.subjectFrauden
dc.subjectExperimenten
dc.subjectC72en
dc.subjectC91en
dc.subjectD82en
dc.subjectH26en
dc.titleThe hidden costs of tax evasion : collaborative tax evasion in markets for expert servicesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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