Covert integration of core state powers : renegotiating incomplete contracts

Abstract

This chapter argues that the integration of core state powers in the European Union, as defined and investigated in this volume, has frequently occurred not manifestly in the formal central political arena but rather in a process of covert integration, without being explicitly mandated by formal political actors. It has arguably led to a ‘competence creep’ from the national to the supranational level, and from legislative to executive and judicial actors. Deepening integration through covert integration happens because it is politically more expedient and politically less costly. It reveals different patterns that may be theoretically grasped by rational choice institutionalism and the theory of incomplete contracts developed and applied in a multi-level context. The chapter will theorize and overall empirically analyse the conditions and processes of covert integration and their ‘stopping points’ on the basis of the empirical policy areas discussed in this volume and some additional examples from my own research.