Type: Contribution to book
Why lawyers are nice (or nasty) : a game-theoretical argumentation exercise
Carole HAFNER (ed.), Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Artificial Intelligence and law, New York : ACM, 2009, pp. 108-119
SARTOR, Giovanni, RUDNIANSKI, Michel, ROTOLO, Antonino, RIVERET, Régis, MAYOR, Eunate, Why lawyers are nice (or nasty) : a game-theoretical argumentation exercise, in Carole HAFNER (ed.), Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Artificial Intelligence and law, New York : ACM, 2009, pp. 108-119 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/30408
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/30408
Full-text via DOI: 10.1145/1568234.1568247
Initial version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/12320
Version: Published version of EUI LAW WP 2009/08
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