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dc.contributor.authorSARTOR, Giovanni
dc.contributor.authorRUDNIANSKI, Michel
dc.contributor.authorROTOLO, Antonino
dc.contributor.authorRIVERET, Régis
dc.contributor.authorMAYOR, Eunate
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-18T12:21:04Z
dc.date.available2014-03-18T12:21:04Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationCarole HAFNER (ed.), Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Artificial Intelligence and law, New York : ACM, 2009, pp. 108-119en
dc.identifier.isbn9781605585970
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/30408
dc.description.abstractThis contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/12320
dc.titleWhy lawyers are nice (or nasty) : a game-theoretical argumentation exerciseen
dc.typeContribution to booken
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/1568234.1568247
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.description.versionPublished version of EUI LAW WP 2009/08en


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