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dc.contributor.authorVAN KOTEN, Silvester
dc.contributor.authorORTMANN, Andreas
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-28T14:26:32Z
dc.date.available2014-11-28T14:26:32Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33632
dc.description.abstractSelf-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2014/114en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectExperimental economicsen
dc.subjectSelf-regulatory organizationsen
dc.subjectGovernmental oversighten
dc.subjectC90en
dc.subjectL44en
dc.subjectG18en
dc.subjectG28en
dc.titleSelf-regulatory organizations under the shadow of governmental oversight : an experimental investigationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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