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dc.contributor.authorTRIPKOVIC, Bosko
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T14:23:01Z
dc.date.available2014-12-08T14:23:01Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationTransnational Legal Theory, 2014, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 285-313en
dc.identifier.issn2041-4005
dc.identifier.issn2041-4013
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33791
dc.description.abstractThe article explores the relationship between the use of foreign law in courts and legal positivism. The point of departure is Jeremy Waldron’s notion that foreign consensus is our law; such law exists outside of a legal system, depends on its moral merits and hence brings some of the central positivist commitments into question. The article maintains that even if foreign consensus were our law, this would not undermine legal positivism, and—moreover—that foreign consensus is actually not our law. In so doing, it advances an account of foreign law as a facultative theoretical authority that is best explained by the positivist idea of judicial law making.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofTransnational Legal Theoryen
dc.titleJudicial comparativism and legal positivismen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.5235/20414005.5.2.285
dc.identifier.volume5en
dc.identifier.startpage285en
dc.identifier.endpage313en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue2en


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