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dc.contributor.authorFUDENBERG, Drew
dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-19T18:00:03Z
dc.date.available2014-12-19T18:00:03Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationJournal of economic behavior & organization, 2012, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 606-612
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33962
dc.description.abstractThe most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual, so that individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied. Both ex ante and ex post fairness can be satisfied but then the individual does not have well defined preferences over own lotteries. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.language.isoEn
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bv
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of economic behavior & organization
dc.subjectFairness
dc.subjectRisk
dc.subjectEx-ante fairness
dc.subjectIndividualistic ethics
dc.subjectcardinal welfare
dc.subjectutility
dc.subjectaltruism
dc.subjectjustice
dc.titleFairness, risk preferences and independence : impossibility theorems
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.004
dc.identifier.volume81
dc.identifier.startpage606
dc.identifier.endpage612
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