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dc.contributor.authorMAURIN, Vincent
dc.contributor.authorVIDAL, Jean-Pierre
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-19T18:00:08Z
dc.date.available2014-12-19T18:00:08Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationRecherches économiques de Louvain-Louvain economic review, 2014, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 47-83
dc.identifier.issn0770-4518
dc.identifier.issn1782-1495
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33998
dc.description.abstractHow large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcet's jury theorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric.
dc.language.isoEn
dc.publisherDe Boeck
dc.relation.ispartofRecherches économiques de Louvain-Louvain economic review
dc.subjectMonetary policy
dc.subjectCollective decision-making
dc.subjectOptimal committee size
dc.subjectVoting rules
dc.titleMonetary policy deliberations : committee size and voting rules
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.volume80
dc.identifier.startpage47
dc.identifier.endpage+
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue2


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