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dc.contributor.authorFARINHA LUZ, Vitor
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-05T12:29:56Z
dc.date.available2015-08-05T12:29:56Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/36675
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions under which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies are provided. The mixed equilibrium features: (i) cross-subsidization across risk levels, (ii) dependence of offers on the risk distribution and (iii) price dispersion generated by firm randomization over offers.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2015/15en
dc.relation.hasversionhttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/69732
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectAsymmetric and private informationen
dc.subjectMechanism designen
dc.subjectOligopolyen
dc.subjectEconomics of contractsen
dc.subjectInsuranceen
dc.subjectC72en
dc.subjectD43en
dc.subjectD82en
dc.subjectD86en
dc.subjectG22en
dc.titleCharacterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insuranceen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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